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SUMMARY OF THE OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
On November 24,1989, the Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion in the case of Regional Sales 
Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct App. 19|89). The opinion was written by 
Judge Billings. Although the parties, both as appellants and cross-appellants, argued several matters in 
1 
their briefs and before the Court of Appeals, the opinion focused on three issues: (1) the calculation of 
damages by the jury, assigning prejudicial error to an instruction selected and given by the trial court, (2) 
the issue of the court!s reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the absence of a record, to include 
findings of fact, and (3) the propriety of the court's denial of Mr* Reichert's motion to amend his counter-
claim to include a claim of breach of contract by Regional Sales. The Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded for a determination of damages consistent with the opinion, reversed and remanded on the issue 
of attorney fees and affirmed on the denial of the Petitioner's motion to amend his counter-claim. The 
Court of Appeals failed to consider the effect of the admission of Exhibit 10 by Regional on the issue of 
damages, although Petitioner raised that issue before the Court of Appeals. A copy of the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals is attached as Appendix A. 
This Court should note that in each case where the trial court entered a discretionary ruling contrary 
to the Regional's interests, that the Court of Appeals reversed and in the case where the trial court 
exercised its discretion in favor of the interests of Petitioner, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdiction is laid in this Court pursuant to Rule 42, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Rule 43 
specifies the standards under which the Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari should be granted (1) When a 
decisions of one panel of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with the decisions of another panel of that 
court, (2) when a decision of a panel of the Court of Appeals decided an issue of state or federal law which 
is in conflict with a decision of this Court, (3) when a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision that is so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for this 
Court's powers of supervision, and (4) when the Court of Appeals has decided a matter of state, municipal 
or federal law which should be decided by this Court. This petition rests upon claims that the Court of 
Appeals violated the provision of subsections (2) and (3) as referenced above. 
CONTROLLING PROVISION OF CONSTITUTIONS, ETC. 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The case below involved the attempt by Regional to enforce a written contract entered into between 
the parties in August of 1979, securing the services of Petitioner as Salesman, leading to potential future 
ownership of Regional Sales by Petitioner. Regional Sales sought t i enforce a liquidated damages 
provision based upon a covenant not to compete. The covenant not to compete involved a three year 
prohibition restraining Mr. Reichert from selling for principals of Regional Sales Agency following 
termination of his services under the contract (R. 2-4) 
In order to recover, Regional Sales had to prove that the contract of 1979 was enforceable, that the 
liquidated damages provision was not unlawful as a penalty, that the)covenant not to compete was 
enforceable, that Mr. Reichert breached the agreement, and finally the calculation of damages in the event 
of a breach. Since the verdict entered by the jury was a general verdict, it is not possible to determine the 
basis upon which they decided each of these issues, or the extent of Regional Sales damages as calculated 
by the jury. (R. 252) 
Petitioner defended on the basis that the agreement of Augus^ 13,1979 was a sham which the 
parties never intended to enforce. In 1977, the parties entered into ai^  oral agreement under which Mr. 
Reichert would eventually own Regional Sales Agency. The contract of 1979 was represented to Mr. 
Reichert as "window dressing" intended to satisfy the IRS in the event of an audit, that Mr. Reichert was 
not an employee, but was an independent contractor. The concerns on the part of Regional Sales 
regarding an audit by the IRS stemmed from the change in Regional Sales' status from a sole 
proprietorship to a corporation in 1979. Through a belabored process of discovery in which Regional was 
not totally cooperative, facts regarding a breach of the contract by Regional Sales prior to that of Mr. 
Reichert finally came to light when Mrs. Helen Kiholm finally produced documents which had been 
requested in 1985, and for which there was an order of the court granting Petitioner's motion to compel 
the production of the same. These documents were produced virtually on the eve of the first trial 
scheduled before Judge Russon, and this delay explains the perhaps untimely motion by Petitioner to 
amend his counter-claim. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On April 39,1987, Petitioner moved to amend his counter-claim to add a claim for damages due to a 
breach of the contract of 1979 by Regional Sales. (R. 132) That motion was denied. (R. 149) The case 
was originally to be tried before Judge Russon on May 1,1987. (R. 127) Due to the conduct of Mrs. 
Kiholm while testifying and the responsive conduct of the bench, Judge Russon, in chambers with 
counsel for Petitioner present, offered to recuse himself, and that offer was subsequently accepted by 
Petitioner. (R. 149 — note that the entry in the record, rather than stating "Comes now counsel for the 
defendant11, states " Comes now the Court, after discussions with counsel & grants defendant's motion for 
recusal") Several months lapsedbefore the case was assigned to Judge Brian, who likewise denied 
Petitioner's motion to amend the counter-claim, although the motion was been made on May 26,1987, 
thus being a timely motion. (R. 160) The hearing on the motion to amend was continued until June 11, 
1987, at which time it was denied. (R. 165,173-4) Trial before Judge Brian was set for September 14, 
1987, which trial was continued until December 14,1987. (R. 170,175) The jury, on December 16, 
1987, entered a general verdict for Regional, for "792.18, (Each party to bear their own legal fees)". (R. 
252) Counsel for Regional objected to the failure to award fees, and thereafter filed a notice of hearing on 
that issue on January 29,1988. (R. 331) That date and time were scheduled by counsel for Regional on 
January 8th, 1988. (id-) There was no plenary hearing on the issue of attorney fees at that time, since 
counsel for Regional failed to request the presence of a court reporter, and brought it on the trial court's 
law and motion day. Therefore, Regional failed to preserve a record for review on appeal as to the 
determination by the court of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. In fact, counsel for the parties 
stipulated to the Court's determination of the amount and awarding of attorney fees to Regional, and on 
appeal complained of having so done, insofar as counsel for Regional was concerned. (T. 246) 
The case involved several attempts at discovery by Petitioner directed at locating and identifying 
thousands of documents upon which the claims, counter-claims and defenses of the parties rested. 
Regional failed to comply with requests for production of documents, and at one point counsel for 
Petitioner was forced to resort to a motion to compel, which was made on March 25,1985 and granted on 
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April 23,1985. (R. 92,99) In fact, several of the documents upon which Petitioner based his motion to 
amend the counter-claim were not produced by Regional until nearly the eve of trial, and therefore the facts 
underlying the amendment were partially unknown prior to that time. 
Although Regional claimed on appeal below that the parol evidence offered by Petitioner was 
improperly used to influence the jury's calculation of damages, there is no direct evidence on such. 
Furthermore, by admitting the ledger Exhibit P-10, Regional sought to impeach the parol evidence offered 
by Mr. Reichert, and since this ledger was put together overnight during trial, Regional indicated that it 
could indeed calculate damages, making the liquidated damages provision unenforceable. Regional 
thereby consented to a trial of the issue of damages on the basis of Mr. Reichert's testimony, having 
confronted the issues involved by offering Exhibit P-10. 
STATEMENT Of MATERIAL FACTS 
In September of 1977, the parties to this suit entered into an oral agreement, securing the services 
of Mr. Rolland Reichert (Petitioner) as salesperson for Regional Sales Agency, which at that time was a 
proprietorship owned by the Kiholms. (T. 8,128-132) Under the terms of that agreement, Mr. Reichert 
could maintain, solicit and service his own sales accounts and principals, apart from those of Regional 
Sales Agency (Respondent). (T. 33) In 1979, Regional Sales Agency incorporated itself as a Utah 
corporation, and pursuant to the advice of its accountants, sought legal counsel to draft a new written 
agreement between the parties. (Appendix B, T. 24) Paragraph "D" of that agreement lists specifically 
those principals then represented by Regional Sales Agency. The terms of paragraph "B" authorized 
Petitioner to sell those products handled by Regional corporation for the principals listed in paragraph "F" 
(none are listed there but there is a list of them in paragraph "D") together with "any additional principals 
which it may represent during the term of this agreement." (See appendix B) Paragraph K of that 
agreement states that Petitioner is "free to dispose of such portion of his entire time, energy and skill 
during regular business hours as he is not obligated to devote hereunder to Company in such manner as he 
sees fit and to such persons, firms or corporations as he deems advisable." (Appendix B) Paragraph "L", 
which is interpreted as a covenant not to compete, provides that Petitioner was restrained for a period of 
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three years following the termination of his "employment" from representing "any principal of Company 
for the purpose of selling any of the Products." (Appendix B) Paragraph "L" further provides that "nor 
will he with respect to the Products in any way ... solicit, divert or take away any Principal of Company 
... Agent shall not... with respect to the Products, or any other products similar to the Products sell to, 
divert, take away, solicit, or attempt to solicit, business or patronage from any of Company's customers, 
accounts or any [other entity] in supply relationships with Company; And he shall not disclose 
[confidential account or trade information]" ... Agent further agrees to pay Company its reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs which are incurred as as a result of his breach of any provision herein." Of 
utmost importance is the language of this paragraph relating to the measure of damages in the event of a 
breach by Mr. Reichert: "In the event that Agent breaches the provisions of this paragraph, all proceeds 
and benefits derived therefrom by Agent shall be received by him in trust for Company, and shall be paid 
to Company upon demand by Company." Demand was never made by Regional. 
Regional claims that in 1983 Mr. Reichert's services had fallen below the conduct required in the 
contract of 1979, and terminated his services. (T. 16-17) In late 1983 and early 1984, Regional mailed 
letters to several entities, all of whom it claims were its principals, informing them that Mr. Reichert had 
been terminated effective December 31,1983 and that he would be replaced by a Mr. Jim Lord. (T. 56) 
This letter was sent to Artfaire, Carousel Products and Atlas Textiles. (T. 56-59) The reactions of these 
so-called Principals of Regional Sales is interesting. Artfaire, upon receipt of the letter, notified Regional 
Sales that it considered Mr. Reichert to be their representative. A subsequent letter from Artfaire 
terminated the arrangement between it and Regional Sales. Carousel Products reacted in a similar 
fashion, as did Adas Textiles. (M-) Atlas Textiles terminated its relationship with Regional Sales on 
January 5,1984, while Artfaire terminated Regional Sales on February 28,1984 and Carousel terminated 
its relationship with Regional Sales in January, 1984. (MO 
Testimony at trial also demonstrated the fact that, even if Artfaire had been a principal of Regional 
Sales on December 31, 1983, was not as of February 28, of 1984. Mr. Dennis Nelson, Western regional 
Sales Manager for Artfaire testified that he set up an appointment for an interview with Petitioner and 
subsequently selected him as Artfaire's representative in Utah. (T. 112-114) A contract was sent to 
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Regional Sales, and was signed by Helen Kiholm. Artfaire didnft want the signature of Mrs. Kiholm as 
they had never had any dealings with her, and subsequently returned the contract for Mr. Reichert's 
signature. (M.) IN the fall of 1983, Mr. Nelson was contacted by Mr. Kiholm, who inquired about the 
performance of Petitioner as their sales representative. Mr. Nelson indicated that he was satisfied with Mr. 
Reichert1 s performance. (T. 115) In December of 1983, Mr. Kiholm called Mr. Nelson again and 
informed him that "Mr. Reichert was no longer with him as a partner in his business" and that Regional 
Sales would bring in a Mr. Lord. (T. 116-117) Mr. Nelson further replied that "I didn't know of any 
instance where Mr. Kiholm was involved in the sale of Artfaire merchandise" and advised Mr. Kiholm that 
he would be reviewing the representation of Artfaire in Utah. (T. 117) Mr. Nelson further states that he 
had never worked with anyone but Mr. Reichert, and that he approached Mr. Reichert and offered him an 
appointment as representative for Artfaire. (T. 117-119) Artfaire hired Mr. Reichert only after the 
termination of the 60-day waiting period in the contract originally signed by Mr. Reichert, in February of 
1984. (T. 120) Mr. Nelson was clear that Artfaire approached Mr. Reichert for the position as sales 
representative, and not vice versa. (T. 120-121) There was no evidence tat Mr. Reichert was selling 
competing lines following his termination, or that he disclosed any trade or account secrets. In short, the 
entire claim for damages made out by Regional rested upon disputed evidence as to whether or not Mr. 
Reichert wrongfully represented Artfaire, Adas Textiles and Carousel Product, and the assumption that 
that representation violated the three year prohibition on so doing. 
Accordingly, the jury was faced with the following issues of disputed fact: (1) Were Artfaire, 
Atlas Textiles and Carousel Products Principals of Regional in 1983, and if so, for how long?, (2) If so, 
did Mr. Reichert represent them while they were principals, and if so, for how long?, (3) Did Mr. Reichert 
solicit, divert or take away any principal of Regional following his termination?, (4) did he violate the non-
compete and divulgence of trade/account secrets provisoins of Paragraph "L"?, and (5) what is the 
appropriate measure of damages for these violations, if any are found? 
6(a) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING AND REMAINDING ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES 
AS AWARDED BY THE JURY AT TRIAL. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals to remand on the issue of calculation of damages is 
improper in that it calls for the substitution of the judgment of the Court of Appeals for that of the 
trial judge and the jury itself, without regard to well established legal precedent. The Court of 
Appeals opines that rules of contract interpretation applied to the language of paragraph "L" of the 
agreement result in a conclusion that the provisions of that paragraph are unambiguous. The Court 
of Appeals states: 
We find the relevant noncompetition and liquidated damage provisions unambiguously provide that 
Mr. Reichert was not to represent any principal of Regional's for three years following his 
termination. 
(Reichert at 47-48) The Court of Appeals goes on to find that because of the validity of the 
provisions of Pargraph "L" that the instruction of the trial court regarding the measure of damages 
produced prejudicial error evidenced by the amount of damages actually awarded. The instruction 
requested by Regional provided that it was entided to recover all commissions paid to Mr. Reichert 
for Artfaire, Carousel and Adas Textiles for three years following his termination. In contrast, the 
instruction of the court, which was actually given, provided for measuring damages by comparing 
the actual damages to those claimed, and if the relation between actual and claimed damages in 
reasonable, then the liquidated damages provision is enforceable. (Reichert at 48). This 
instruction is in complete harmony with established law as set forth by this Court. In Madsen v. 
Anderson, 667 P.2d 44 (Utah 1983) this Court established the rules governing the enforceability 
of liquidated damages provisions: 
As a general rule in Utah, parties to a contract may agree to liquidated damages in the case of a 
breach, and such agreements are enforceable if the amount of liquidated damages agreed to us not 
disproportionate to the damages actually sustained. 
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Madsen at - iso Robbins v. Finlav. 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982); Johnson v. Carmen, 572 
P.2d 371 (Utah 1977) and Perkins v. Spencer. 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952). It is 
readily apparent that the instruction given by the trial court is a neai verbatim statement of the rule • 
of law established by this Court, whereas the instruction requested is not. The instruction 
requested does not apply the principles governing the law of enforceability of liquidated damages 
provisions, and sis Midi is nupiopn I he i\\ "it ol Appeal 'u»l mi' reversed and remanded based 
upon a deficient instruction, but its decision fails to establish the rules of law set forth by this Court 
and is in conflict with them. The Court of Appeals concluded that because the language of 
paragraph "I•" is unambiguous, that Regional was entitled, as a matter of law, to all commissions 
paid on sales from Artfaire, Carousel and Atlas textiles. Such reasoning avoids the legal tests 
mentioned above, and obviates the need for the finder of fact to first determine whether or not 
liquidated are a reasonable estimate of actual damages suffered. Accordingly, the instruction given 
was a proper statement of the law a established by this Court and the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is in conflict with ihe decisions of thr< Court 
For the purposes of argument, Petitioner is willing to concede the points made by the Court 
of Appeals as stated above. Under this concession, Petitioner would admit that Regional Sales 
was entitled to $42,176.09 in commissions from the three claimed principals listed above. 
However, the real test in reversing the award of damages made by the jury is to ascertain whether 
or not there was a sound basis in evidei ice a nci pleadings foi their conclusion Such a basis can be 
demonstrated by a review of available evidence and the pleadings before the court. 
In his counter-claim, Mr. Reichert states in Paragraph 7 (R. 31) that Regional Sales was 
required, to pay commissions of 40% of all sales except Skaggs from September 1,1979 to the date 
of termination (December 31,1983), and that Regional Sales never intended to pay them. At trial, 
evidence was offered that demonstrated that Regional Sales did not pay any of those commissions, 
due and owing to Mr. Reichert. (T. 207, 213-214) This provided a basis for the jury to formulate 
a valid offset against the damages claimed by Regional Sales. 
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Furthermore, Mrs. Kiholm admitted at trial that she had kept commissions which Mr. 
Reichert had earned in 1983, as an offset to claimed damages without any intention of paying them 
to him. The amount of those commissions was never specified. (T. 55-56) This was a proper 
subject of offset against liquidate damages claimed by Regional Sales. 
In short, the jury could have indeed found that the liquidated damages provision of the 
contract was enforceable, and could have made an initial award of $42,176.09 to Regional Sales. 
There was ample and proper evidence supportive of an offset under the counter-claim, of an 
amount of money which the jury concluded was due and owing Mr. Reichert, leaving a net award 
to Regional of some $700. The fact that Regional did not require the entry of a special verdict 
detailing the calculations of the jury is not the fault of Petitioner. Had Regional done this, a proper 
basis for concluding that the instruction of the court was prejudicial could be entertained. 
However, Regional failed to preserve a record on this point and in fairness to Petitioner cannot 
now complain of its own failures and deficiencies in this regard. The Court of Appeals 
accordingly erred in concluding that the award of the jury was made under the confusing influence 
of an improper instruction. The jury could have proceeded to calculate damages by awarding the 
entire liquidated amount and still have concluded that there was a valid offset. This Court should 
not forget that evidence supportive of an offset came not only from Mr. Reichert, but from Mrs. 
Kiholm as well. The award of the jury likewise not the product of using parol evidence 
improperly. The jury could have determined that any or all Artfaire, Carousel or Atlas Textiles 
were not principals of Regional but os Mr. Reichert. 
POINT H 
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS ERROR GIVEN THE FACT 
THAT THERE WAS NO RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT BELOW MADE AND 
PRESERVED BY REGIONAL. 
On appeal, it is axiomatic that it is the duty and responsibility of the Appellant (Regional) to 
marshall evidence in support of its claim, and the failure to preserve a record of such evidence is 
fatal to all claims dependant upon it. Regional claimed that the trial court erred in "reducing" the 
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amount of attorney fees awarded. Regional was therefore under an obligation to present evidence 
that supported this claim. The only evidence produced was that of Counsel's affidavit. 
The jury bekm \\\ n<1< <1 M Ikes and >sis to i OOII >t 1 in lis general UTCIJU (Counsel for 
Regional took exception to this, and brought a motion for his fees and costs on Judge Brian's law 
and motion calendar. Since counsel for the parties had stipulated to the court's determination ot 
fees and losts, Region il had i lie fig In lo except to the award of no fees and costs made by the jury. 
There was therefore no recorder present and no record of the proceedings. Counsel for Regional 
offered his affidavit of fees and costs, asking in excess of $26,000 Although their \ as no record 
preserved, counsel for Petitioner asserted at that time that the affidavit was deficient in several 
respects: (1) That the affidavit failed to separate those fees and costs claimed for brining the failed 
injuitt lion sought by Kej'ioiul < J»lli.il ihe aliidavil hlrtl lo meel the tests of case law, including 
that set forth in Dixie State Bank. (3) that the fees were very disproportionate when compared to 
the amount actually recovered. The judge asked counsel for Petitionn whai \ icasonahl^ fee would 
be, bin counsel v> as reluctant to answer that question directly, since in effect he would be deciding 
the fees of opposing counsel in light of his duties to Petitioner. Nevertheless, Counsel for 
Petitioner suggested thai ten in iin I lie uniHiiit >l pidjuniail onlillu exressive and unreasonable. 
Judge Brian thereafter entered the amount of $7,500, which is less than ten times the award of 
judgment. Counsel for Petitioner, further placed the court on notice of the requirements of Dixie 
State Bank at that Hint Hit ninin »u for attorney fees was that of counsel for Regional, the motion 
carried in the amount of $7,500 and counsel for Regional had the responsibility to preserve a 
record and the formulation of findings of fact supportive of the awani of fee mtl lailnl lo do so. 
It was improper loi ihi l ourt of Appeals to lay responsibility for these deficiencies at the feet of 
the trial court, and to use such as the means of reversing a valid order of the court. 
Counsel has the lesponsibilitv lo makr mil piesrnr i ice on! tor purposes of appeal. In 
Powers v. Gene's Building Materials. 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977) this Court held that failure to 
preserve a record for appeal was fatal to appellant's cause, for there A as nothing for the appellate 
court 111 rr\ ie w In Powers, the Defendant below sought recusal of the judge involved, and made 
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its motion for recusal in private, preserving no record of the hearing on that motion. Therefore, the 
Court of Appeals in appropriately addressed the propriety of the manner of securing relief elected 
by the Defendant The Court of Appeals confused the lack of a record with the lack of an 
explanation for the trial court's "reduction" of attorney fees: 
Unfortunately, the trial court made no such finding. Because the trial court gave no explanation for 
its reduction of attorney fees, we reverse the award and remand for the trial court to enter an 
amount supported by the undisputed evidence or alternatively to make findings to support the 
reduction consistent with the authority cited herein (incl. Martindale v. Adams. 777 P.2d 514 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)) 
Reichert at 50, emphasis added, citations omitted The trial court did make findings 
regarding the "reduction" of attorney fees and did explain its actions, but counsel for Regional 
failed to make and preserve a record of such. The burden for preserving the record on these 
matters or entering findings was inappropriately laid at the feet of the trial court at the expense of 
fairness and justice to the Petitioner. 
The review of a claim for attorney fees must be based upon clear evidence of an abuse of 
discretion. (Sears v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105, at 1110) Without the benefit of a clear record 
on this matter, Petitioner fails to understand how a clear abuse of discretion could have been found 
by the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is at variance with the 
decision of this Court In First Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Wright. 521 P.2d 563 (Utah 
1974) this Court unequivocally held that "In the absence of a record, this Court assumes that it 
supports the judgment." Wright at 566. Finally, the Court of Appeals cites the case of Martindale 
v. Adams. 777 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) in its opinion in Reichert. 
In Martindale. the trial court reduced the amount of attorney fees requested, at a hearing 
which counsel for the unsuccessful party did not even attend. There was a record preserved of the 
hearing, at which the court reduced the fees requested without finding them unreasonable. The 
Court of Appeals noted that the amount requested was "adequate and undisputed" and that the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested unless the reduction was 
warranted by one or more of the factors in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 
11 
1988). In the case at bar, Petitioner and his counsel attended the hearing set by counsel for 
Regional on law and motion day, and did in fact dispute the propriety of the fees requested, citing 
Dixie State Bank .mil OIIHM authority tor Petitioner's position I inloriunately, counsel for Regional 
did not request a reporter and failed to preserve a record of those contentions, and in the absence of 
such a record, the Court of Appeal had no choice but to sustain the award of fees. The fact that the 
Coin t of appeals remanded in the absence of a record setting forth a clear abuse of discretion is 
inconsistent with the decisions of this Court. Certiorari is therefpre warranted to avoid a serious 
miscarriage of justice against Petitioner. 
poiNTm 
THE AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO AMEND ITS 
PLEADINGS "¥v AS ERROR AND NO'I IN HARMONS WTI H THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
The decisions of this Court clearly hold that amendments to pleading should be liberally 
granted, in the absence of surprise and prejudice, in order to avoid offending justice based upon 
technicalities or procedural rules and to afford parties a day in court together with an opportunity to 
have their dispute settled on the merits of their cause or defense. The rules of procedure aimed at 
allowance of amendment fnvoi amendment, ami place upon ihe panv opposing amendment the 
burden of showing that allowing amendment would cause prejudice or surprise. This Court 
iterated the principles underlying the liberal granting of leave to amend pleadings: 
[Motions to amend pleadings] must all be looked to in the light of their even more fundamental 
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the 
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have regarding their dispute. What 
they are entided to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When that is 
accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules require liberality to allow examination into and 
settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to 
have reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so requests. 
Chem v. Rucker. 11 I lull ?d 2l).\ 381 P Af Hi. (1%,?) a! <>1; se^ also Williams v. State Farm 
Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). The clear intent of the rules allowing amendment is to 
(1) liberalize pleading and procedure to afford parties the privilege of presenting legitimate 
contentions, (2) The other party is simply entitled to notice of the issues raised and an opportunity 
12 
to meet those issues. Petitioner does not argue that the attempt at amendment on the eve of trial 
before Judge Russon may have been prejudicial to RegionaTs cause. Nevertheless, the disallowal 
of the amendment by Judge Brian was clear error, given the fact that trial was then several months 
away and such denial violated the letter and spirit of Rule 15, as interpreted in Cheny, and as 
established by this Court. Finally, the Court of Appeals specifically disallowed the opportunity to 
amend Petitioner's counter-claim on remand, even though there can be no claim of prejudice at this 
late date, nearly three years after the first attempt to amend, and Petitioner should in all fairness be 
allowed to present material issues supportive of a legitimate claim. Petitioner seeks the ruling of 
this Court to vacate the ruling of the Court of Appeals with regard to Petitioner's amendment. 
Should this Court decline to vacate the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding a re-trial of 
damages, then Petitioner requests this Court to rule to allow Petitioner an opportunity to amend its 
counter-claim so that an offset can be effectuated, in the interests of justice. Furthermore, this 
Court should send a clear signal to the bench and bar alike, that liberal amendment should be 
allowed, indeed should be favored, absent a clear showing of prejudice. To allow the new trial to 
proceed in the absence of such an amendment would allow the liquidate damages provision of the 
contract to function as a penalty, since Petitioner would pay for and Regional would be enriched 
by, monies covering overhead and other expenses which Regional did not actually have to pay. 
Responectfully submitted this i~2L day of January, 1990: 
USER 
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ri-R ITFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
CERTIORARI was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ ~ ^ d a y of January, 1990, to the following: 
BRYCEE.ROE 
FABIAN & CLENDENTN 
215 South State Street 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
APPENDIX A 
assumed responsibility for 
the infant's physical well-being by agreeing 
to deliver it at home; defendant did not insist 
on examining the mother when she reported 
vaginal bleeding to determine if premature 
birth was likely or if so7 what precautions 
ibould be taken to minimize the likelihood of 
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the 
infant after birth as having Respiratory Dist-
ress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to 
position the infant in a way which relieved the 
symptoms but would not alleviate the condi-
tion itself; defendant minimized the serious-
ness of the infant's condition to Ivy and 
Joanne; three of the ten children he had deli-
vered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant 
could die from the disease and that the disease 
was progressive; defendant could not himself 
admit the infant into a hospital because he 
lacked malpractice insurance, so would have 
to call another physician or have the infant 
admitted through an emergency room facility; 
Ivy testified that defendant only told her to 
watch the infant for changes in his tempera-
ture, color and respiration, without advising 
her as to the degree of change which might 
indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or 
Joanne that death could result from the 
disease; and defendant left the infant in the 
care of laypersons. 
There was other, conflicting evidence which 
would indicate that defendant should not have 
been aware that a substantial risk existed. 
However, the existence of conflicting evidence, 
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury 
verdict. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424-
25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The jury has been 
through the arduous task of listening to and 
assessing the evidence presented in this most 
difficult case, and I do not think that we 
should appropriately substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was 
based on what defendant knew or the jury 
believed he knew at the time, and its assess-
ment that given that knowledge he should 
have known the risks. I do not find the evid-
ence 'sufficiently inconclusive/ as do my 
colleagues, to justify conviction. I would 
conclude that the record, while heatedly con-
troverted, contains sufficient evidence for the 
jury to conclude that defendant should have 
been aware that a substantial and unjustified 
risk of death existed, and to convict defendant 
of negligent homicide as a result. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
novo, Utah 
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BaLIN£S, Judge: 
Regional Sales Agency, inc. ("Regional") 
appeals from a jury verdict awarding it 
S792.18 in damages as a result of cross-
appellant Roland Reichert's ("Mr. Reichert") 
breach of a non-competition agreement with 
Regional, his former employer. Regional also 
appeals the trial court's reduction of its atto-
rney fees which Regional claims were provided 
for by the parties' written contract and reas-
onably incurred in prosecuting this action. 
Mr. Reichert cross-appeals the court's 
denial of his attempt to amend his counterc-
laim to add a claim for unpaid commissions 
and salary. We reverse and remand in part, 
and affirm in part. 
Since the late 1950s, Edward and Helen 
Kiholm have operated a small family business 
which acted as a manufacturer's representative 
in designated territories of the mountain west. 
The business earned commissions from its 
principal manufacturers by selling their goods 
to retailers. 
In 1977, the Kiholms hired Mr. Reichert as 
an independent contractor to handle outside 
sales. If the relationship was satisfactory, the 
Kiholms intended to retire in ten years with 
Mr. Reichert taking over the business. Mr. 
Reichert worked for the Kiholms until 1978 
when the business was incorporated as Regi-
onal. 
In 1979, Mr. Reichert entered into a written 
employment contract with Regional. The 
employment contract contains a non-
REPORTS UTAH ADVANC 
competition clause restricting Mr. Reichert 
from representing manufacturers represented 
by Regional or competing with Regional'* 
manufacturers for a three-year period after 
the termination of his relationship with Regi-
onal. The contract also contains the following 
damage and attorney fees provisions central to 
ti&mppeib 
In the event Agent breaches the 
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s [ n o n -
competition] paragraph, all proc-
eeds and benefits derived therefrom 
by Agent shall be received and held 
by him in trust for Company, and 
shall be paid to Company upon 
demand by Company. 
Agent further agrees to pay 
Company its reasonable attorneys' 
fees and costs which are incurred as 
a result of his breach of any prov-
ision herein. 
On April 30, 1987, the day before a non-
jury trial was scheduled before Judge Leonard 
H. Russon and more than three years after 
Mr. Reichert's original answer and counterc-
laim had been filed, Mr. Reichert filed an 
amendment to his counterclaim. In this ame-
ndment, Mr. Reichert claimed Regional owed 
him commissions and salary from 1977 
through 1983. Judge Russon struck the ame-
ndment. On May 26, 1987, after Judge Russon 
had recused himself at Mr. Reichert's request, 
and a mistrial had been granted, Mr. Reichert 
filed a written motion to amend his counter-
claim again asserting a claim for commissions 
and wages. The motion was denied by Judge 
Pat B.Brian. 
At trial it was undisputed that after Mr. 
Reichert left Regional in 1983, he continued to 
represent three manufacturers whom he had 
previously represented as a salesman for 
Regional: Artfaire, Carousel Party Favors, 
Inc., and Atlas Textiles. He received commi-
ssions of $42,176.09 from these manufacturers 
in the three-year period after his relationship 
with Regional ended. 
In defense of his actions, Mr. Reichert 
claimed the written agreement of August 13, 
1979, was never intended to have any force or 
effect. He insisted that Regional represented 
that it was merely "window dressing1' to 
protect Regional in case of a tax audit. 
The }ury found the 1979 employment agre-
ement was enforceable and neither party has 
appealed this issue.1 However, the jury only 
awarded Regional $792.18 in damages. 
The parties stipulated that evidence suppo-
rting reasonable attorney fees as provided for 
by the employment agreement would be sub-
mitted to the judge by affidavit following the 
jury verdict. Counsel for Regional submitted a 
lengthy affidavit detailing $26,740.50 in fees. 
No opposing affidavit was submitted by Mr. 
Reichert. The court, witnout giving any expl-
anation, awarded Regional $7,500 in fees. 
The issues we address in this appeal are: (1) 
whether Regional should have a new trial on 
the issue of damages; (2) whether the judge 
abused his discretion in reducing Regional*! 
attorney fees; and (3) whether the trial court 
tntd vxv deoying Mi. Rekhm'% motion \o 
amend his counterclaim to add a claim for 
unpaid commissions and salary. 
L DAMAGES 
Regional challenges the jury's damage 
award claiming it is contrary to the unambig-
uous terms of the parties9 non-competition 
agreement which provides a formula to calc-
ulate damages. Regional claims the inadequate 
damage award is a result of the trial court 
improperly instructing the jury on the issue of 
damages. 
The provisions of the 1979 agreement 
dealing with damages at issue on appeal 
provide: 
At no time during the term of 
this agreement, or within a period 
of three years following the termi-
nation of Agent's employment shall 
Agent [Reichert], for himself or in 
behalf of any other person, firm, 
partnership or corporation (other 
than the Company [Regional!) 
represent any Principal of company 
for the purpose of selling any of 
their products. 
Because a breach of this provi-
sion will result in irreparable 
damages which are difficult to 
measure ... Company at its election 
shall be entitled to an injunction 
restraining Agent from breaching 
the terms of this provision. 
In the event Agent breaches the 
provisions of this paragraph, all 
proceeds and benefits derived ther-
efrom from agent shall be received 
and held by him in trust for 
company, and shall be paid to 
company upon demand by 
company. 
In the first instance, the determination of 
whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law. Wilburn v. Interstate Elec., 
IAS P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). If 
the trial court finds the agreement unambig-
uous and interprets its meaning by examining 
only the words of the agreement, this interp-
retation also presents a question of law. Kimball 
v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). We thus "accord [the trial court's] 
construction no particular weight, reviewing its 
action under a correctness standard." Id. The 
trial court's selection of jury instructions int-
erpreting contractual language also presents a 
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question of. law. "Therefore, we grant no 
particular deference to the trial court's 
ruling.9 Ramon v. Fan, 770 P.2d 131, 133 
(Utah 1989). 
'Where questions arise in the interpretation 
of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is 
within the document itself. It should be looked 
it in its entirety and in accordance with its 
purpose. All of its parts should be given effect 
insofar as that is possible/ Big Cottonwood 
Turner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 
1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also 
Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prods. Co., 614 P.2d 
160,163 (Utah 1980). 
We find the relevant non-competition and 
liquidated damage provisions unambiguously 
provide that Mr. Reichert was not to represent 
any principal of RegionaTs for three years 
following his termination. Mr. Reichert adm-
itted at trial that during his tenure with Regi-
onal, the company represented Carousel Pro-
ducts, Atlas Textiles, and Artfaire, three of 
RegionaTs former principals as defined by the 
parties' contract. The agreement further pro-
vides that if Mr. Reichert does represent any 
of RegionaTs principals, then he will hold all 
commissions earned as a result of this prohi-
bited representation in trust for Regional. 
Regional relied on this contractual language 
and introduced evidence that Mr. Reichert 
collected $42,176.09 in commissions from 
Carousel, Atlas, and Artfaire during the three 
years following his termination. 
Regional requested the following instruction 
reflecting its theory that the contract provided 
a formula for determining damages based on 
these earnings in violation of the contract: 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in 
addition to any other damages it 
may prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence, all commissions rece-
ived by defendant during the years 
1984, 1985, and 1986 from Artfaire 
Carousel Party Favors, Inc., and 
Atlas Textiles. 
This instruction was refused by the trial court. 
The court substituted the following instruction 
on damages: 
Where the parties agree on a 
method of establishing damages for 
breach of contract, the agreement is 
enforceable if it is designed to 
provide fair compensation for the 
breach, based upon a reasonable 
relation to actual damages. 
Regional claims the instruction given is 
contrary to Utah law. In Young Electric Sign 
Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 
162 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
considered a liquidated damage provision in a 
contract. The court reversed the trial court 
which had required the plaintiff to prove 
actual damages to validate the liquidated 
UTAH 
damage provision. The court stated: 
[A]s a general rule, parties to « 
contract may agree to liquidated 
damages in the case of a breach, 
and such agreements are enforce-
able if the amount of liquidated 
damages agreed to is not disprop-
ortionate to the possible compens-
atory damages and does not const-
itute a forfeiture or a penalty. 
Reasonable liquidated damages 
provisions may reduce the cost of 
litigation by obviating the expense 
entailed in proving actual damages. 
If a liquidated damages provision is 
enforceable, a plaintiff need not 
prove actual damages. The burden 
is on the party who would avoid a 
liquidated damages provision to 
prove that no damages were suff-
ered or that there is no reasonable 
relationship between compensatory 
and liquidated damages. 
Id. at 164 (citations omitted); see also Robbins 
v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623,627 (Utah 1982). 
The instruction given by the trial court in 
this case, in effect, put the burden on Regi-
onal to establish that the liquidated damages 
provision of the agreement provided fair 
compensation for Mr. Reichert's breach and 
the resulting damages awarded were reason-
ably related to the actual damages suffered by 
Regional. This is contrary to Utah law. 
Even if the instruction could be read to put 
the burden on Mr. Reichert to show no 
damages were suffered or there was no reas-
onable relationship between the actual 
damages Regional suffered and the $42,176.09 
it would collect under the agreement, there 
was insufficient evidence introduced below to 
enable the jury to find either proposition. Mr. 
Reichert did not establish that the $42,176.09 
in commissions awarded under the liquidated 
damage provision would be disproportionate 
to the amount of damage Regional suffered by 
its loss of commissions from three of its 
former principals. On appeal, Mr. Reichert 
does not point to any evidence offered below 
to show that the liquidated damages provision 
was unreasonable nor does he compare the 
liquidated damages to the actual damages 
suffered by Regional.2 
We cannot say that a provision which 
returns the commissions lost for a three-year 
period as a result of the breach of a non-
competition agreement is unreasonable as a 
matter of law. Although this liquidated 
damages formula does not reflect expenses 
incurred by Mr. Reichert in earning the com-
missions, it is limited to three years. Regi-
onaTs loss of profits as a result of its perm-
anent loss of three of its principals to Mr.' 
Reichert could certainly have exceeded a three-
year period and thus the liquidated damages 
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provided by application of the contractual 
provision. __ 
We believe the jury verdict was a result of 
improper instruction and the admission of 
evidence on the issue of commissions which 
Mr. Reichert claimed were owing him. This 
testimony was received over objection and the 
trial court limited its application to the issue 
of the enforceability of the 1979 agreement. 
Nevertheless, this evidence undoubtedly 
further confused the jury. This evidence on 
unpaid commissions would be inadmissible on 
retrial on the limited issue of damages under 
the contractual damages provision. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse and 
remand for a new trial on the issue of 
damages consistent with the legal principles 
stated herein. 
n. ATTORNEY FEES 
In Utah, litigants can recover attorney fees 
only if they are authorized by statute or pro-
vided for by contract. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citing 
Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 
730, 734 (Utah 1985); Turtle Management, 
Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 
667, 671 (Utah 1982)); see Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-56 (1987). Moreover, *[i]f provided 
for by contract, the award of attorney fees is 
allowed only in accordance with the terms of 
the contract/ Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 
988 (citing Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 
858 (Utah 1984)); see also Turtle Management, 
Inc., 645 P.2d at 671; LAM Corp. v. 
Loader, 688 P 2d 448,450 (Utah 1984). 
In the present case, the contract of the 
parties provides: 
Agent [Reichert] ... agrees to pay 
Company [Regional] its reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs which are 
incurred as a result of his breach of 
any provision herein. 
The parties stipulated at trial that, if the 
jury found for Regional on {the enforceability 
of the contract, the court would determine the 
appropriate award of attorney fees. Following 
trial, counsel for Regional submitted an affi-
davit supporting his fees detailed by a comp-
uter accounting of the hours worked and tasks 
accomplished on RegionaTs behalf. Regional 
claimed it had incurred a total of $26,740.50 
in attorney fees and costs of S610.46. Counsel 
for Regional also testified that the fees were 
reasonable considering the nature and extent 
of the work performed. Mr. Reichert made no 
objection to the affidavit nor did he offer 
opposing testimony on the issue of reasonable 
attorney fees. The court made no findings of 
fact nor conclusions of law on the issue of 
attorney fees but simply entered an order 
awarding $7,500 in fees to Regional. 
It is generally within the trial court's disc-
retion to determine the reasonable attorney 
fees which should be awarded and we will not 
overturn the award absent an abuse of discr-
etion. See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988; 
Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 
1984); Turtle Management, Inc., 643 P.2d at 
671. We 'will presume that the discretion of 
the trial court was properly exercised unless 
the record dearly shows the contrary." Ooddard 
v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 
(Utah 1984) (quoting State ex rd Road 
Comm'n v. General OH Co., 22 Utah 2d 60, 
62, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968)). See also 
Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987). However, 
where parties to a contract agree that attorney 
fees will be awarded, those attorney fees pro-
visions should ordinarily be enforced by the 
court. Cobabe v. Crawford, 117 Utah Adv.. 
Rep. 26,27 (Ct. App. 1989). 
An award of attorney fees must be based on 
evidence in the record which supports the 
award. See Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 
100, 103 (Utah 1983). However, a trial court is 
not compelled to accept the self-serving tes-
timony of a party requesting attorney fees 
even if there is no opposing testimony. See 
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 
(Utah 1978). A court can evaluate the fees 
requested and determine a lesser amount is 
reasonable under the circumstances. See Dixie 
State Bank, 764 P.2d at 989. Several practical 
factors to consider in determining a reasonable 
attorney fee are 
the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys in pres-
enting the case, the reasonableness 
of the number of hours spent on 
the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the 
case and the result attained, and the 
expertise and experience of the att-
orneys involved., 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 
1985); see also Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 
989. 
We have consistently encouraged trial courts 
to make findings to explain the factors which 
they considered relevant in arriving at an att-
orney fee award. See, e.g., Cabrera, 694 P.2d 
at 624. Findings are particularly important 
when the evidence on attorney fees is in 
dispute or the trial court has reduced the att-
orney fees from those requested and supported 
by undisputed evidence. Id. 
We have recently held that a trial court 
abuses its discretion in awarding less than the 
amount of attorney fees requested when there 
is adequate and uncontroverted evidence in the 
record to support those fees unless the court 
offers an explanation for the reduction cons-
idering the factors previously discussed. See 
Martindale v. Adams, HI P.2d 514, 518 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Dixie State 
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Ban*, 764 P.2d at 987-91. 
In this case, the trial court substantially 
reduced the attorney fees requested from 
S26.740.S0 to $7,500 even though the record 
contained undisputed testimony delineating the 
services performed and that the rate and time 
expended were reasonable and necessary. The 
trial court made no findings or explanation for 
its sua sponte reduction. 
Mr. Reichert argues that the court's redu-
ction of fees was proper because the fees were 
incurred as a result of Regional'* unsuccessful 
attempt to secure an inunction. Unfortuna-
tely, the trial court made no such finding. 
Because the trial court gave no explanation for 
its reduction of attorney fees, we reverse the 
award and remand for the trial court to enter 
the amount supported by the undisputed evi-
dence or alternatively to make findings to 
support the reduction consistent with the 
authority cited herein. 
BL DENIAL OF MR. REICHERT'S 
MOTION TO AMEND 
On April 30, 1987, three years after com-
mencement of the litigation and following 
extensive discovery, Mr. Rdchert filed an 
"Amendment to Counterclaim" seeking judg-
ment against Regional for "all commissions, 
compensation, wages and salary found to be 
due and owing" for the years 1977 through 
1983. A non-jury trial was scheduled for the 
next day. The trial court struck the attempted 
amendment. After the trial commenced, Mr. 
Reichert moved to recuse the assigned trial 
judge. Judge Russon declared a mistrial and 
the case was reassigned to Judge Brian who 
denied a subsequent, identical motion to 
amend filed by Mr. Reichert. The propriety of 
the trial court's denial of Mr. Reichert's 
amendment must be measured against Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), which states: 
A party may amend his pleading 
once as a matter of course any time 
before a responsive pleading is 
permitted and the action has not 
been placed upon the trial calendar 
... otherwise, a party may amend 
his pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires.... 
The decision to allow an amendment is 
discretionary with the trial court as part of its 
duty to manage proceedings below. We will 
not disturb a trial court's decision absent an 
abuse of discretion. See Girard v. Appleby, 
660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983); Chadwick v. 
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah a . App. 
1988); Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794, 797 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In analyzing the grant or denial of a motion 
to amend, Utah courts have focused on three 
factors: the timeliness of the motion; the jus-
• . 
to,* 
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tification given by the movant for the delay; 
and the resulting prejudice to the responding 
party. See Tripp, 746 P.2d at 797. 
Appellate courts have upheld a trial court's 
denial of a motion to amend where the ame-
ndment is sought late in the course of the lit-
igation, where there is no adequate explana-
tion for the delay, and where the movant was 
aware of the facts underlying the proposed 
it long before its filing. Imperial 
Enter., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 533 F.2d 
287, 293 (5th Or. 1976); Girard, 660 P.2d at 
248; Westlcy v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 
93,94 (Utah 1983). 
Rule 13(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure focuses on the moving party's respo-
nsibility to articulate reasons for the delay: 
"When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable 
neglect, or when justice requires, he may by 
leave of court set up the counterclaim by 
amendment." Without such justification, 
[t]he amendment of pleadings on 
the eve of trial causes great disru-
ption to the legal process and is 
unfair to an opponent who has 
conducted discovery, fully prepared 
the case, and scheduled trial time 
based on the moving party's prior 
pleadings. 
Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 820. 
Courts have also found it important when 
denying a motion to amend that new causes of 
action or issues are added with consequent 
disadvantage to the responding party. Girard, 
660P.2dat248. 
In his brief, Mr. Reichert alleges the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow 
his amendment because the issues presented 
did not substantially vary the issues and evi-
dence already involved in the case. We disa-
gree. The issues raised by RegionaTs compl-
aint were limited to the validity of the parties' 
contract, particularly its non-competition 
clause and Mr. Reichert's alleged breach of 
the non-competition clause. The counterc-
laim interjected the issue of commissions due 
and paid to Mr. Reichert for a six-year 
period involving an analysis and accounting of 
sales figures not previously at issue. 
Mr. Reichert made his first attempt to 
amend his counterclaim on the day before the 
trial was scheduled to commence and more 
than three years after his original answer was 
filed. Mr. Reichert offered no justification for 
his delay in asserting his claim for unpaid 
commissions.3 
Thus, Mr/ Reichert, on the eve of trial, 
attempted to insert new issues in the case 
without giving any adequate explanation for 
his delay. We believe this amendment would 
have prejudiced Regional. On the facts before 
us and under the authority previously discu-
ssed, we find the trial court did not abuse its 
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diicretion in denying the amendment. 
In fummary, we reverie and remand on the 
issue of damages and attorney fees, but affirm 
the trial court's denial of Mr. Rdchert's 
attempt to amend his counterclaim. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell. W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. In its brief. Regional complains about several 
[spues being submitted to the jury and the court's 
decision not .to direct a verdict. Specifically, Regi-
onal claims (1) there was insufficient evidence to 
submit to the jury the question of whether the 1979 
agreement was intended to have legal effect, and (2) 
the court should have directed a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff on the issue of liability. However, since 
the jury decided the issue of enforceability of the' 
contract in Regional'* favor, we do not consider 
these arguments. Whatever error may have occurred 
was harmless. 
2. The only evidence alluded to by Mr. Reichert is 
evidence establishing certain unpaid commissions. 
This evidence was not admitted on the issue of 
damages but was specifically restricted to the issue 
of the enforceability of the 1979 contract, and is 
legally irrelevant to the damages provision at issue. 
3. Later in the proceedings, Mr. Reichert again tried 
to add his claim for unpaid commissions by filing a 
Motion to Amend his counterclaim. This motion, 
also made without justification, violated Utah Code 
Ann. §78-7-19 (1989), which provides: 
If an application for an order, made to 
a judge of a court in which the action or 
proceeding is pending, is refused in. 
whole or in part, or is granted conditi-
onally, no subsequent application for 
the same order can be made to any 
other judge.... 
Cite as 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Stephen P. Zimmerman appeals an Indust-
rial Commission order which denied him per-
manent disability benefits. We affirm. 
In January 1987, Zimmerman was employed 
by Granite Beef, Inc. His duties consisted of 
cutting and boxing meat, requiring him to lift 
heavy boxes and pallets. On January 26, 1987, 
Zimmerman, while lifting an empty pallet, 
heard a pop in his low back and felt an 
immediate sharp pain. He reported the inci-
dent to his supervisor and left work to obtain 
medical attention. At the time of the accident, 
Zimmerman was twenty-two years of age. He 
had worked as a laborer since age seventeen 
and had never complained of back problems 
prior to the accident. X-rays and a CT scan 
revealed no acute fracture. His injury was 
diagnosed as a musculotendinous strain. 
Zimmerman applied for disability benefits 
on February 5, 1987 and received temporary 
total disability benefits from January 30, 1987 
to March 4, 1987. On approximately March 1, 
1987, Zimmerman returned to work. While 
lifting a heavy piece of meat at work, he 
experienced a recurrence of back pain. He 
remained off work for another period of time 
and was again paid temporary total compen-
sation from March 11, 1987 through April 29, 
1987. His benefits were terminated, however, 
when he failed to keep two doctor appointm-
ents. Compensation was reinstated on May 27, 
1987 and he was paid through June 25, 1987, 
when his benefits were again suspended for 
failure to keep a physical therapy appoint-
ment. 
Following further therapy, on approximately 
July 1, 1987, Zimmerman began working for a 
new employer, Wescot Fiberglass Company. 
After working approximately one month with 
Wescot, Zimmerman was injured while grin-
ding dowit the edges of a large fiberglass 
container. The boards on which he was sitting 
gave way and he rolled off, landing on his 
back. He experienced shooting sensations and 
pain in his lower back and quit work because 
of pain. He did not file a claim in connection 
with this accident. Additional temporary total 
disability benefits, however, were paid by the 
Workers' Compensation Fund from Septe-
mber 9,1987 through January 29,1988. 
On January 6, 1988, a hearing was condu-
cted before an administrative law judge 
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APPENDIX B 
A G R E E M E N T 
THIS AGREEMENT, made on the _A?ff day of CL^r^^Jtr , 1979, 
by and between REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC, a corporation, identi-
fied as the Company, herein referred to as "Company", and ROLAND W. 
REICHERT, identified as the Company's sales representative, herein 
referred to as "Agent", shall be as follows: 
A. The Company is the representative of certain 
factories, manufacturers, and other principals engaged in 
selling certain of their products. The purpose of this 
agreement is to develop and sustain a satisfactory volume of 
sales of Company's products in the territory assigned to Agent. 
B. Company authorizes Agent to sell those products 
handled by Company (hereinafter referred to as "Products") for 
those principals of the Company included in the list of 
principals contained in paragraph F below, and any additional 
principals which it may represent during the term of this agree-
ment. These Products are to be sold at prices and terms cur-
rently in effect and from quotations set forth in Company's 
approved price lists and schedules. 
C. Agent shall adhere to, cooperate and comply with 
Company's sales policies and programs. 
D. Company grants Agent the exclusive privilege to 
sell the Products to all purchasers (unless excluded by 
mutual agreement in writing!, except Skaggs Companies, Inc. 
and its successors in the case of a merger, in the terri-
tory of Utah, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming and Nevada. The Skaggs 
Companies, Inc. exception shall be for a forty-month period, 
only, commencing on the 1st day of September, 1979. 
Commissions shall be computed on the net amount of 
the invoice after deducting discounts, allowances, trans-
supplies of advertising literature, samples and displays, to 
encourage and facilitate the saie of Company's Products. 
J, Agent's employment shall be for an eight-year and 
four-month period, commencing on September 1, 1979. Either 
party may, at its or his election, terminate Agent's employ-
ment for any reason. 
K. Agent is retained and Employed by Company only for 
the purposes and to the extent set forth in this agreement, and 
his relation to Company shall dtiring the period or periods of 
his employment and services hereunder, be that of an inde-
pendent contractor. He shall be free to dispose of such por-
tion of his entire time, energy, and skill durincr regular busi-
ness hours as he is not obligated to devote hereunder to Company 
in such manner as he sees fit and to such persons, firms, or 
corporations as he deems advisable, within the limitations con-
tained herein. Agent shall not be considered under the pro-
visions of this agreement or otherwise as having an employee cr 
partner's status. 
L. At no time during the term of this agreement, or 
within a period of three years immediately following the 
termination of Agent's employment shall Agent, for himself or 
in behalf of any other person, firm, partnership or corporation 
(other than Company) represent any principal of Company for the 
purpose of selling any of the Products; nor will he with respect 
to the Products in any way, directly or indirectly, for himself 
or in behalf of any other person, firm, partnership or corpo-
ration (other than Company) solicit, divert, or take away any 
principal of Company during the term of this agreement or for 
three years following the termination of Agent's employment. 
Agent shall not during said period, with respect to the Pro-
ducts, or any other products similar to the Products, directly 
or indirectly, for himself or in behalf of any other person, 
firm, partnership or corporation (other than Company) sell to, 
divert, take away, solicit, or attempt to solicit, business or 
paid to Company upon demand by Company. 
Agent further agrees to pay Company its reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs which are incurred as a result of 
his breach of any provision herein. 
Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting Company 
from pursuing any other remedies available to it for such 
breach or threatened breach, including the recovery of damages 
from Agent. 
M. The waiver by Company of a breach of any provision 
of this agreement by Agent shall not operate or be construed as 
a waiver of any subsequent breach by Agent. 
N. The rights and obligations of Company under this 
agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding 
upon its successors and assigns. 
0. The rights of Agent under this agreement shall not 
be assigned to any person or business entity without the prior 
written consent of Company. Agent recognizes that his personal 
involvement in the business of Company is an important part of 
the consideration for this agreement and therefore that any 
failure by Company to consent to any proposed assignment shall 
not constitute a breach of the agreement by Company. 
P. The obligations of Agent under this agreement shall 
be binding upon his successors, assigns, heirs, and personal 
representatives. 
Q. This instrument contains the entire agreement of 
the parties. It may not be changed orally but only by an 
agreement in writing signed by the parties. 
R. This agreement shall be governed by and construed 
according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the part i e s have executed t h i s agree-
ment in duplicate t h i s A ? ^ d a y of (2t£f/£<££' r 1979. 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC. 
Its President ' ~\ 
/ 
